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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
CaseNo.20040077-CA
v.
MICHAEL VON FERGUSON,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order reducing a charge of violating a protective
order, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999), from a third degree felony to a
class A misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Robin W. Reese presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
1.

Shelton v. Alabama holds that where an uncounseled guilty plea to a misdemeanor

charge results in a suspended jail term, the jail term is invalid, but the conviction is valid.
May this valid conviction be used to enhance a later charge?
2.

Which party bears the burden of proof on the question of whether defendant

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in a prior plea proceeding?

Both issues raise questions of law reviewed for correctness. See Hutchings v. State,
2003 UT 52, % 11, 84 P.3d 1150. Both are preserved. See R. 250-52, 287-88; R. 338: 3-7.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Central to the resolution of this case are Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999) and Utah
Code Ann. §77-36-1.1 (2003):
76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another — Violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective
order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant
Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter
36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as described
in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after
having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a
greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse
Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic
violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in
accordance with Section 77-36-1.1.
77-36-1.1. Enhancement of offense and penalty for subsequent domestic
violence offenses.
(1) When an offender is convicted of any domestic violence offense in Utah,
or is convicted in any other state, or in any district, possession, or territory of the
United States, of an offense that would be a domestic violence offense under
Utah law, and is within a five-year period after the conviction subsequently
charged with a domestic violence offense that is a misdemeanor, the offense
charged and the punishment for that subsequent offense may be enhanced by one
degree above the offense and punishment otherwise provided in the statutes
described in Section 77-36-1.
(2) For purposes of this section, a plea in abeyance is considered a
conviction.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Amended Domestic Violence Information filed 11 April
2003 with four counts:
Count I

Attempted murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2000);

Count II

Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-202 (Supp. 2001);

Count III

Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of 76-6-404 (1999);

Count IV

Violation of a protective order, enhanced to a three degree
felony, in violation of 76-5-108 (1999).

R. 20-23. The magistrate bound defendant over on the charges of attempted murder and
violation of a protective order, but dismissed the burglary and theft charges. R. 336: 88-89.
Defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover, arguing that "the State did not meet its
burden of proof at the preliminary hearing of presenting sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause that Mr. Ferguson committed the crime of violation of a protective order, a
third degree felony." R. 33-41. The trial court ruled that the State had met its burden of
"showing probable cause regarding the Violation of a Protective Order charge." R. 287
(addendum A). However, it struck the enhancement. R. 288 (addendum A). The State
sought, and this Court granted, leave to appeal this interlocutory order. R. 329.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The victim obtains a protective order against defendant
Defendant lived with Julia Jepson for twenty years. R. 336: 28. During this time, he
mentally, physically, and verbally abused her. R. 336: 29. He would drive her to her work
at Brickyard Kennel in Salt Lake City, because she "wasn't allowed her to drive [her] car."
R. 336: 36. When she occasionally went out back of the building, "he'd be sitting out there
in a car, watching." R. 336: 36-37. Although she needed medical attention for her injuries
more than once, she didn't report the abuse to police until 5 January 2003. R. 336: 29-30.
According to a Verified Petition for Protective Order filed 7 January 2003, on 5 January
2003 defendant cut Jepson's telephone line, cracked the windshield on her car, and shattered
her sliding glass door. R. 230-31. Defendant threatened Jepson's life; when she tried to
leave, he threatened to cut her dog's throat. R. 231. Jepson called the police, but defendant
fled before they arrived. R. 231. He later returned, kicked in the side glass door, and made
more threats on Jepson's life. R. 231. She called police and defendant again fled, but was
later arrested. R. 231; R. 336: 30.
Jepson spent that night at her work and her daughter spent the night with other people.
R. 231. Defendant spent six days in jail. R. R. 336: 31. The first day, he left 28 messages
on Jepson's answering machine. R. 336: 30. About seven of them were threatening,

1

The facts are taken from allegations in the preliminary hearing and exhibits.
Defendant has not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offenses.
4

"basically along the lines of, when he gets out, he's going to get even, it doesn't matter how
long it takes." R. 336: 31. These messages remained on Jepson's answering machine until
17 March 2003, when her house was broken into and the messages erased. R. 336: 47.
A protective order was entered 8 January 2003 prohibiting defendant from contacting
or harassing Jepson or going near her place of employment. R. 210-12.
After defendant's release from jail, his sister called Jepson, but when Jepson took the
call, defendant was on the line. R. 336: 48. She told him, "this is against the protection
order, I want nothing to do with [you], to leave me alone." R. 336: 49. The conversation
ended "with a lot of begging to let him come back," but Jepson refused. R. 336: 49.
The protective order was finalized 21 January 2003. R. 221. It provided, "Respondent
is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment, and/or other places, and their
premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children, and the designated household and
family members." R. 222. The order listed the address of Jepson's place of employment,
Brickyard Kennel. R. 222. It restrained defendant "from attempting, committing, or
threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner." R. 221.
Defendant pleads guilty to violation of the protective order
On 18 March 2003, defendant pled guilty to violating the protective order, a class A
misdemeanor. R. 109-11. He was sentenced to one year in jail, but the time was suspended
and he was placed on probation. R. 110-11. Court documents show he was not represented
by counsel. R. 109-13 (addendum B).
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Defendant violates the protective order a second time
Six days later, Salt Lake City Police Officer Sullivan was flagged down by two people
who reported seeing a man with a rifle on the roof of Media Play. R. 336: 8-9. Media Play
is located behind Brickyard Kennel, where Jepson worked. R. 336: 35-36.
As the officer approached Media Play, he saw defendant on the roof. R. 336: 9-10.
When Officer Sullivan asked why he was on the roof, defendant replied that he was repairing
the rain gutter. R. 336:11. Officer Sullivan went inside the store and spoke with a manager,
who informed him that no maintenance was scheduled for the roof. R. 336: 11-12.
By the time Officer Sullivan left Media Play, defendant was gone. R. 336: 12. When
Officer Sullivan climbed onto the roof, he found a rifle wrapped in a jacket. Id. The rifle
was loaded; one round was chambered. R. 336: 13.
Around noon, Jepson went outside to walk her dog, but when she noticed helicopters,
news crews, and police cars in the Brickyard area, she checked the television to see what was
going on. R. 336: 42. The reporter said a sniper was on the roof of Media Play, and gave
a description resembling defendant. R. 336:42. Jepson called police, who told her to contact
an officer on the scene. R. 3 3 6:42-43. In the course of a two-and-a-half-hour interview with
police, Jepson identified the jacket found on the roof as defendant's. R. 336: 44.
Defendant }s interview
Homicide detective Allen DeGraw interviewed defendant at the University Hospital,
where defendant was taken after a suicide attempt. R. 336: 52-53. At first defendant said
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he did not want to talk to police, but then began telling the detective how upset he was about
"what his wife was doing to his daughter." R. 336: 69.
After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted that he had been on the roof of
Media Play on the day in question, that he had a rifle with him on the roof, that he had it
because when he locked his bike he had no way of securing the rifle, that he knew he should
not have been in the area, and that he had already been in trouble for violating the protective
order. R. 336: 54-56. He said he was on the roof looking for "tools and things that people
might leave on the roof." R. 336: 55. He left the rifle on the roof. R. 336: 59.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's order striking the enhancement on the charge of violating a protective
order charge should be reversed for two independent reasons. First, even if defendant was
denied his right to counsel when he pled guilty, the resulting misdemeanor conviction
(though not his suspended jail sentence) is valid under controlling Supreme Court precedent
and thus available to enhance a subsequent charge.
Second, the trial court was in any event required to presume defendant's prior
misdemeanor conviction was valid. By placing on the State the burden to establish that
defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel, the trial court in effect reversed
the presumption. The burden is properly defendant's.

7

ARGUMENT
This appeal poses two issues. Both relate to the State's reliance on a prior misdemeanor
conviction to enhance defendant's current charge from a class A misdemeanor to a third
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1 (1999). The prior conviction was entered
pursuant to a guilty plea. R. 110. Although the charged crime was a misdemeanor, because
defendant received a suspended jail sentence, he had the right to counsel at the plea hearing.
A defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive counsel. Although court documents show
that defendant was unrepresented, they do not show whether he knowingly and voluntarily
waived counsel. See R. 109-113 (addendum B). So far the parties agree.
They part company on two points, both questions of law. First, irrespective of whether
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel at the plea hearing, may the resulting
conviction enhance his current charge under controlling United States Supreme Court
precedent? And second, if not, who bears the burden of proving whether defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel?
L
A PRIOR UNCOUNSELED GUILTY PLEA MAY ENHANCE A
SUBSEQUENT CHARGE BECAUSE, UNDER SHELTON V.
ALABAMA, A PRIOR CONVICTION IS VALID, ALTHOUGH THE
RESULTING SUSPENDED TERM OF INCARCERATION IS NOT
Under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, defendant's prior
misdemeanor conviction may be used to enhance his current charge, even if he was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the prior proceeding.
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Defendant is charged with violation of a protective order. R. 20-23. A person subject
to a protective order "who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having been
properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108(1)
(1999). However, if the offense is committed within five years of a prior domestic violence
conviction, the offense may be enhanced to a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 77-361.1(1) (2003). Defendant fits this category. However, his prior conviction was entered
pursuant to a guilty plea at which defendant was unrepresented by counsel. R. 109-11
(addendum B). He was sentenced to a suspended jail term. Id.
The trial court ruled that under Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), because
defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction resulted in a suspended sentence, it
"cannot be used to enhance count II unless the State presents evidence that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel." R. 287-88 (addendum A). The court
rejected "the State's argument that Shelton only invalidates the jail sentence given pursuant
to an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, and does not impact the conviction itself." R.
288 (addendum A). The trial court misread Shelton.
Shelton is the third in a trio of United States Supreme Court cases addressing the
dimensions of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when a defendant is charged with a
misdemeanor. Despite the plain language of the Sixth Amendment ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defence"),
defendants facing misdemeanor charges do not all enjoy the right to counsel. A defendant
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charged with a misdemeanor is entitled to counsel if the sentence ultimately imposed
includes incarceration, even if jail time is suspended.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that "absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Id. at 37. In Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "actual imprisonment"
triggered the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. Id. at 373. (Scott had no right to
counsel because his sentence included a $50 fine, but no jail time; hence, his conviction was
affirmed. Id at 368-69, 373.)
Shelton involved an unrepresented defendant who did not duly waive counsel. 5 3 5 U. S.
at 657. He was not imprisoned, but received a suspended jail sentence. Id. at 658. The
Court held that a suspended sentence is indistinguishable from an imposed sentence for
purposes of the right to counsel, since Shelton would be unable to challenge the original
judgment at any later probation revocation hearing. Id. at 667. He was thus denied the right
to counsel. Id. at 674.2
However, the Court did not reverse Shelton's conviction. It affirmed the order of the
Alabama Supreme Court, which invalidated Shelton's suspended jail sentence, but affirmed
his conviction. Id. at 659,674. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed Shelton's conviction. See

2

This decision effectively overruled Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655 (Utah
App. 1997).
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United States v. Ortega, 94 F.3d 764, 769 (2nd Cir. 1996) ("The appropriate remedy for a
Scott violation . . . is vacatur of the invalid portion of the sentence, and not reversal of the
conviction itself.").3
Shelton thus stands for the proposition that, where a defendant charged with a
misdemeanor is not represented and does not duly waive counsel, his conviction and any
portion of the sentence not involving incarceration are valid, but any imposed or suspended
jail time is invalid. The conclusion is logical: had the sentencing court imposed no jail time,
the defendant would not have been entitled to counsel and his conviction and sentence would
have been valid; hence, vacating the jail time relieves an uncounseled defendant of that
portion of his sentence upon which his right to counsel hung.
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), issued after Scott but before Shelton, is
the leading case on using prior misdemeanor convictions to enhance later charges. It holds
"that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scoff because no prison term was
imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction." Id. at
749 (overruling Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)). The Court reasoned that
enhancement statutes "do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction," but
penalize only the subsequent offense. Id. at 747. The rule of Nichols is, then, that an

3

A contrary rule obtains in felony cases: a conviction obtained in violation of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel may not be used in a subsequent proceeding
either to support guilt or to enhance punishment. Burgettv. Texas, 389 U.S. 109,115 (1967).
Accord State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1989) (citing Burgett); State v. Branch,
743 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1987) (citing Burgett).
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otherwise valid misdemeanor conviction is also valid for purposes of enhancing a later
conviction.4
In sum, under Shelton a misdemeanor conviction imposed in violation of a defendant's
right to counsel is valid (although any jail time is not); under Nichols an otherwise valid
misdemeanor conviction is valid to enhance a subsequent charge. Thus, a misdemeanor
conviction imposed in violation of a defendant's right to counsel is nevertheless valid to
enhance a subsequent charge.5

4

Nichols also states that Nichols's "uncounseled misdemeanor conviction [was] valid
under Scott because no prison term was imposed." 511 U.S. at 749. This statement seems
to imply that, had a prison term been imposed, Nichols's uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction would not have been valid. However, any such implication was overruled sub
silentio eight years later when the Court affirmed Shelton's conviction after holding his right
to counsel had been violated.
5

The United States Solicitor General made this very argument in Iowa v. Tovar, 124
S. Ct. 1379 (2004). Tovar's third drunk driving conviction was enhanced from a
misdemeanor to a felony based on two prior misdemeanor convictions. Id. at 1385. Tovar
argued that his first conviction was invalid because the judge did not "elaborate on the right
to representation" before accepting his waiver of counsel. Id. at 1383. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument, holding that "the constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial
court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the
entry of a guilty plea." Id.
The United States, as amicus curiae, proposed an alternative ground for affirmance.
Id at 1387, n. 10. Citing United States v. Ortega, it argued that "a constitutionally defective
waiver of counsel in a misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting vacation of any term
of imprisonment, affords no ground for disturbing the underlying conviction." Id. Thiis, an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent
offense "regardless of the validity of the prior waiver." Id. However, because the State of
Iowa did "not contest the Iowa Supreme Court's determination that a conviction obtained
without an effective waiver of counsel cannot be used to enhance a subsequent charge," the
Supreme Court did not reach this issue. Id.
12

So here, even if defendant's misdemeanor conviction was obtained in violation of his
right to counsel, it remains valid under Shelton and thus available under Nichols to enhance
his current charge. The trial court's contrary conclusion is incorrect as a matter of law.

n.
DEFENDANT BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING HE DID NOT
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN THE PRIOR PLEA PROCEEDING
Where the State relies on a prior conviction to enhance a pending charge, it bears the
burden of proving the prior conviction, which is then entitled to a presumption of regularity.
This presumption imposes on defendant the burden of proving that he was uncounseled in
the prior proceeding and that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive counsel.
The trial court misplaced this burden. In quashing the enhancement on the charge of
violation of a protective order, it ruled that, even after the State has proven the prior
conviction, the burden remains on the State to "present[] evidence that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel." R. 288 (addendum A).
State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146 (1989), controls. Convicted of second degree felony
theft, Triptow was sentenced as a habitual criminal based on his two prior felony convictions.
Id. at 146-47. Triptow argued that, "before evidence of a prior conviction can be admitted,
the State has the burden of showing not only that the conviction occurred, but also that the
defendant had counsel at the time of the previous guilt determination." Id. at 147.
The court rejected Triptow's challenge to his prior convictions. It held that a judgment
of conviction "is entitled to a presumption of regularity, including a presumption that the
13

defendant was represented by counsel. This presumption satisfies any initial burden the State
may have of proving that the defendant had or knowingly waived counsel"

Id. at 149

(emphasis added). The burden then shifts to defendant: "After proof of the previous
conviction is introduced, the burden is on the defendant to raise the issue and produce some
evidence that he or she was not represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive
counsel" Id. (emphasis added).6
Here, proof of defendant's prior misdemeanor conviction satisfied any initial burden
the State had to prove defendant was either represented by or, in this case, knowingly waived
counsel. The burden then shifted to defendant to produce some evidence that he "did not
knowingly waive counsel'5 in his prior plea proceedings. Id.
This approach is consistent with Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992). Raley was
charged under the Kentucky persistent felony offender statute, which provided mandatory
minimum sentences for repeat felons. Id. at 22. The prosecution introduced copies of
Raley's 1979 and 1981 judgments of conviction for burglary, both of which were based on
guilty pleas. Id. at 24. Raley challenged both prior convictions on the ground that his guilty
pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Id. at 22 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969)). The record of the 1979 guilty plea indicated that defendant was
represented and that his counsel explained to him his rights. Id. at 24. However, the record

6

In State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, 68 P.3d 1035, this Court addressed the
quality of proof necessary to rebut a conviction's presumption of regularity. See id. at \ 11.
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of the 1981 plea showed only that the judge had advised Raley of his right to a jury trial. Id.
at 24-25. It did not show that he was represented or that he had knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel. On federal habeas review the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the 1981 guilty plea. Id, at 25.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that "Kentucky's burden-shifting
rule easily passes constitutional muster." Id. at 28. The Court noted at the outset that Raley
had "never appealed his earlier convictions. They became final years ago, and he now seeks
to revisit the question of their validity in a separate recidivism proceeding." Id. at 29. The
Court also acknowledged the "presumption of regularity/' which, it observed, is "deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence." Id. The Court found "no good reason to suspend the
presumption of regularity here," since this was not a case where "an extant transcript is
suspiciously 'silent' on the question whether the defendant waived constitutional rights":
"[ejvidently, no transcripts or other records of the earlier plea colloquies exist at all." Id. at
30. "Our precedents make clear/' the Court concluded, "that even when a collateral attack
on a final conviction rests on constitutional grounds, the presumption of regularity that
attaches to final judgments makes it appropriate to assign a proof burden to the defendant."
Id. at 31. This is so notwithstanding "serious practical difficulties will confront any party
assigned an evidentiary burden in such circumstances." Id. at 31-32.
TheParke Court readily distinguished Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). Burgett
had addressed the validity of a prior uncounseled conviction. Seeing "no indication in the

15

record that counsel had been waived/' the Court there held that "[presuming waiver of
counsel from a silent record is impermissible."/^. atll2,114-15. However, the Parke Court
noted that at the time of Burgett's plea, "state criminal defendants' federal constitutional
right to counsel had not yet been recognized, and so it was reasonable to presume that the
defendant had not waived a right he did not possess." Parke, 506 U.S. at 31. In contrast, at
the time of Raley's plea, the Boykin requirements were well established, so it was reasonable
to presume that Raley had waived those rights. Id. Read together, then, Burgett and Parke
stand for the rather routine proposition that plea-taking courts are presumed to comply with
all legal requirements in existence at the time of the plea, but not those imposed later.
The trial court here reversed this presumption. Defendant's right to counsel was
established at the time of his guilty plea. Defendant pled guilty 18 March 2003. R. 109-11
(addendum B). Because he received a suspended sentence, he enjoyed the right to counsel
under Alabama v. Shelton, which had been decided the previous year, on 20 May 2002.
Parke and Triptow thus required the trial court to presume that the court accepting
defendant's guilty plea had complied with Shelton. Instead, it required the State to produce
additional evidence that the plea court had complied with Shelton. In effect, the trial court
presumed that the court taking the prior plea had violated the law. That was error under
Triptow and Parke.
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CONCLUSION
The order of the trial court striking the enhancement to the charge of violation of a
protective order should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY submitted o n ^ V T u n e 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

-vs-

Case No. 031902097

MICHAEL VON FERGUSON,

Judge ROBIN W. REESE

Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover having come before this Court for
hearing in the above entitled matter on October 24th, 2003, and November 3 rd , 2003, in
which Defendant was represented by counsel, Vemice Trease, and the State was
represented by counsel, B. Kent Morgan and Alicia H. Cook, the Court having fully
considered the written memoranda and oral arguments of counsel, this Court now enters
its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On March 18th, 2003, the defendant pled guilty to violating a protective order, a
class A misdemeanor, before Judge Medley in District Court case number
031901111, and was sentenced to 365 days in jail. The defendant was not

S<&

represented by counsel when he entered his plea. The jail sentence was
suspended in its entirety and the defendant was placed on probation.
2. On March 26th, 2003, the State filed an information alleging that the defendant
had committed Attempted Homicide, Violation of a Protective Order, Burglary,
and Theft of a Firearm. The protective order violation was enhanced to a third
degree felony based on the defendant's prior conviction in case number
031901111.
3. A preliminary hearing was held on August 26th, 2003, before Judge Iwasaki. The
State presented evidence that the defendant, while carrying a loaded rifle, had
climbed onto the roof of a building neighboring the victim's workplace. The
State also offered a certified copy of the prior conviction to support the enhanced
protective order violation. Defense counsel objected to the use of the prior
conviction, and argued that an uncounseled plea could not be used to enhance a
subsequent offense. The Court overruled the objection and at the conclusion of
the hearing found sufficient probable cause to bind over the Attempted Homicide
and Protective Order Violation charges.
4. On October 16th, 2003, counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Quash the
Bindover. The defense argued that the defendant's prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance the subsequent offense, and
urged the Court to strike the enhancement. The defense also argued that the
evidence presented^at the preliminary hearing failed to establish that the defendant
had actually violated the protective order.

5. This Court heard oral arguments on October 24 l , 2003. At the conclusion of the
arguments, the Court requested that counsel brief the application of Alabama v.
Shelton to the instant case, and scheduled farther arguments for November 3 rd ,
2003.
6. During the November 3rd hearing, counsel for the State argued that Shelton
prohibits the imposition of a suspended jail sentence given to a misdemeanor
defendant who did not have counsel, but does not invalidate the underlying
conviction for purposes of enhancing future crimes. Counsel for the defendant
argued that, whenever a suspended jail sentence is given to a misdemeanor
defendant, Shelton does not permit the use of that conviction for enhancement.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defense's motion to quash the bindover for insufficient evidence is denied.
The State met its burden at the preliminary hearing of showing probable cause
regarding the Violation of a Protective Order charge. The defendant's efforts to
commit homicide against the victim also constitute a violation of the protective
order, which prohibits the defendant from committing or attempting to commit
acts of violence against the victim.
2. The defense's motion to quash the bindover of count II as a third degree felony is
granted. The Court agrees with the defense that under Alabama v.Shelton, a
defendant facing a misdemeanor charge is entitled to counsel when a jail sentence
is rendered, regardless of whether the sentence is suspended or actually imposed.
Defendant Ferguson did not have counsel at the time he entered his guilty plea

and received a suspended sentence, therefore the prior conviction cannot be used
to enhance count II unless the State presents evidence that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The Court disagrees with
the State's argument that Shelton only invalidates the jail sentence given pursuant
to an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction, and does not impact the conviction
itself.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the enhancement to count II is stricken, and
count II stands as a class A misdemeanor.

DATED this ^ /

day of January, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

Judge ROBIN W.REESE

Approved as to form
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